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Bush v. Gore1 is not defensible doctrinally. The opinion is unsound
on a number of grounds, including equal protection,2 standing,3 political question,4 and remedies.5 Indeed, the lack of doctrinal founda* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. I am indebted to
Anna Pond and Keith Goodwin for their research assistance. I would also like to thank
Walter Dellinger and Evan Caminker for their helpful suggestions at the time that I was
beginning my research into this project. I should point out that neither agrees with the position taken in this Essay.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650 (2001)
(“[T]he newly articulated equal protection doctrine is dramatically wide-reaching. . . . The
difficulty in defining the scope of this new equal protection right is made all the worse by
the Court’s disingenuous limiting instruction.”); Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the
New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 691 (2001).
All [the Court] found legally wrong was that the intent-of-the-voter standard—
[the Court] thought unnecessarily—allows different honest counters, or groups
of them, to make different dispositions of identical ballots, on a basis that is utterly random with respect to voter interest. No one’s equal dignity is impugned
by this practice, and only Humpty Dumpty would describe it as valuing one
person’s vote over another’s.
Id.
3. See Note, Non Sub Homine? A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of Election 2000, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2170, 2189 (2001).
The [Bush v. Gore] majority may have implicitly carved out an exception to
equal protection standing requirements that is applicable only to a presidential
election contest. The lack of explicit inferences from prior law and the failure to
distinguish the question of due process for candidates from that of equal protection for voters are weaknesses in the opinion.
Id.
4. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 686 (noting that the Court could have “proper[ly],
honorabl[y]” abstained from intervention by treating the matter as a political question);
Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 760 (“This was not technically a ‘political question,’ but it did not seem to be the kind of question that would warrant
Supreme Court involvement, certainly not at this preliminary stage.”).
5. See Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 651.
Bush v. Gore is entirely lacking in such analysis [of remedies]. The Court presumed that once it found the federal interest, its remedial obligations followed.
In this regard, the Court’s reliance on the magic December 12 date for the safe
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tion in the opinion is so transparent that even the case’s few defenders tend to rest on the grounds offered by the concurrence rather
than the majority.6
Bush v. Gore also does not neatly fit within the Court’s traditional
approach to constitutional principles of federalism and separation of
powers. The opinion gives little or no regard to the state court’s construction of its own law and little or no deference to the constitutional provisions that delegate the resolution of electoral disputes of
the type at issue in the case to the Congress and not to the courts.
Not surprisingly, these doctrinal and theoretical weaknesses have
led numerous observers to roundly condemn the opinion. These academic attacks, even if accurate, however, may fundamentally misconceive what the case was truly about. Bush v. Gore cannot be understood as about legal doctrine. Rather, it is a case that tests the
limits of the Court’s ability to go beyond traditional legal analysis to
achieve what it deems to be a just result—a case that attempts to
achieve what others have dubbed “rough justice.”7 Seen in this light,
the fact that the Court did not follow traditional analysis in order to

harbor under 3 U.S.C. § 5 is particularly ironic. This statutory provision
emerged from a rather deliberate congressional effort to provide for orderly
resolution of presidential election controversies in the wake of the hastilycrafted Electoral Commission approach from 1877. A review of this statute,
however, reveals that it carefully reserved to the political branches the key role
in resolving contested presidential elections.
Id.; David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737,
740 (2001) (“What does seem indefensible is the Court’s remedy.”). John C. Yoo, In Defense
of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 790 (2001).
[T]he per curiam’s sudden introduction of the December 12 cutoff date for a
remedy—based on the assumption that the Florida legislature intended to
adopt the safe harbor date for the selection of presidential electors provided for
by 3 U.S.C. § 5—makes almost no sense at all unless read in light of the concurrence’s structural analysis.
Id.
6. See Richard A. Epstein, ‘In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct’:
The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 634 (2001) (“In sum, there
is ample reason to believe, as the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore urges, that the
Florida Supreme Court adopted, under the guise of interpretation, a scheme for conducting
election challenges that deviates markedly from that which the Florida legislature had set
out in its statutes.”); Yoo, supra note 5, at 790.
This is not to say that the precise reasoning of the per curiam was utterly
correct. I vastly prefer the theory put forward by the Chief Justice’s concurrence: Florida’s judiciary had so re-written the state’s electoral laws that it had
violated Article II’s delegation of authority to the state legislatures to choose
the method for selecting presidential electors.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. The term “rough justice” has been used by both Richard Posner and Richard Hasen to describe the result in Bush v. Gore. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE
DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 23 (2001); Richard
L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 377, 391, 406 (2001).
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reach its decision is not, taken alone, fatal. Nor is it unprecedented.8
As we shall see, the Supreme Court, prior to Bush v Gore, had decided cases with little or no reference to established legal principle in
order to achieve “rough justice.”9 Indeed, in all likelihood, the Supreme Court will continue to exercise this power to act when circumstances so dictate.
The question of whether Bush v. Gore was based on sound legal
principle thus does not end the inquiry. Even if the decision was not
doctrinally or theoretically sound, there remains the question of
whether the Court nevertheless acted illegitimately. This inquiry
may then be broken down into two sub-parts: 1) Was the Court justified in intervening in this case to attempt to achieve rough justice? 2)
If intervention was appropriate, did the Court reach the right result?
This Essay addresses these issues. Part I of the paper discusses
whether Supreme Court intervention to accomplish rough justice in
this case was warranted. Part II of the paper then addresses the
question of whether, if judicial intervention was appropriate, the
Court exercised the power correctly in this case. As will subsequently
become clear, I conclude that although the Court’s intervention was
indeed appropriate, it ultimately reached the wrong result in its decision.
I. BUSH V. GORE AND ROUGH JUSTICE
Imagine the Court believed one of the following: 1) sending the
election to the Congress would have created a constitutional crisis, 2)
the Gore forces were improperly manipulating the vote count in order
to win the election, or 3) the Florida Supreme Court’s decision authorizing the recount to continue was a lawless exercise of judicial
power intended to achieve a partisan result. If so, would its intervention be justified even if its decision were not based in legal principle? I
believe the answer to this question is yes.
Let me immediately clarify this point. I am not arguing that judicial opinions that do not follow legal principles are examples of good
or correct legal decisionmaking. Judicial decisions not based in law
are, by definition, “wrong” jurisprudentially. My point is that the
conclusion that a case is jurisprudentially wrong does not necessarily
end all inquiry into a decision’s legitimacy. Occasionally other exigencies may trump jurisprudential purity. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, for example, make this point in reference to Abra8. For example, as my colleague Eric Muller has noted, the Court’s “shock the conscience” test that it has employed in such cases as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), may be little more than the Court giving itself license to accomplish rough justice
under the guise of an announced judicial standard. ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR
THEIR COUNTRY 154-55 (2001).
9. See infra notes 17, 34, and accompanying text.
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ham Lincoln’s rejection of the rule of law in his suspension of habeas
corpus:
If it was important for winning the Civil War that Lincoln suspend
habeas corpus and infringe on other civil liberties, then the moral
importance of winning the war was sufficient to justify his actions.
Reaching this conclusion . . . does not mean that suspending habeas corpus was right. It just means that this wrong was outweighed by the greater wrong that would have occurred had the
war been lost.10

Courts, like Presidents, may also understand that right results
sometimes require something more than pure fealty to law.11 They
may also realize that exigent circumstances may demand that the
wrong of ignoring legal principle may be outweighed by the need to
avoid the harms that would occur if legal principle were studiously
followed. Certainly for any actor, relying on a nebulous vision of
rough justice is a dangerous ground to tread. In acting outside traditional legal boundaries, any actor risks harming its own institutional
credibility as well as the legitimate expectations of the parties it affects.12 And it may be that because of the specific origins and limits of
judicial power, the Supreme Court may have less latitude to seek to
effectuate rough justice than do the other branches.13 But risky or
not, the power to accomplish rough justice is not alien to the judicial
role. Certainly, as the next section will demonstrate, there is ample
precedent for its use.

10. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382 (1997).
11. There is certainly ample indication in the Bush v. Gore opinion itself that would
indicate that the Court well knew that it was not engaging in business as usual. For example, the fact that the Court strongly suggested that its equal protection analysis might
not extend to future cases would seem illustrative of the Court’s intention to attempt to
reach a specific result only in the case at hand, rather than create new doctrine. See Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of
their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to
assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount . . . .
Id.
12. Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bush v. Gore, of course, makes this very attack
against the majority opinion: “Although we may never know with complete certainty the
identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule
of law.” Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). Because the
other branches are subject to electoral control, judicial action raises a countermajoritarian
difficulty that actions by the Executive and the Congress do not. Id.
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A. Bush v. Gore’s Pursuit of Rough Justice Was Not Unprecedented
The notion that settled constitutional principles give way in exigent circumstances did not originate with Bush v. Gore. As we have
already noted, Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus14 and also directly rejected controlling Supreme Court authority
when he resisted Dred Scott15 and issued the Emancipation Proclamation.16 Similarly, and more importantly for our purposes, the Supreme Court has at times also strayed from strict legal decisionmaking when it believed circumstances so required. Bush v. Gore
was not the first case in which rough justice rather than legal doctrine provided the Supreme Court with its rule of decision.17 The following are but two examples of this exercise.
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Let me begin controversially by offering one of the most important
First Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,18 as a primary example of a case decided by rough justice. The facts of Sullivan are well known but deserve some repeating. On March 29, 1960, The New York Times ran
an ad designed to generate support for the civil rights movement entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”19 The primary thrust of the ad was
to depict the ongoing struggle between the “thousands of Southern
Negro students [who were] engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights”
and the “wave of terror” being waged against them by their opponents.20 Unfortunately, the ad contained a number of inaccuracies. It
stated, for example, that in connection with a demonstration in
Montgomery, students had been padlocked in a cafeteria and police
had ringed the campus where the demonstration had taken place.21 It
also alleged that Martin Luther King Jr. had been arrested seven

14. For a direct comparison of Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and the decision
in Bush v. Gore, see Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, Bush v. Gore: Constitutionalist Though Not Constitutional? 9-11 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
15. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
16. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 10, at 1382-83.
17. Robert Pushaw, for example, makes the point in this symposium that a similar attempt to achieve rough justice occurred when the Supreme Court entered the election law
arena in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 603, 605-11 (2001).
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. Id. at 256.
20. Id. at 256-57.
21. Id. at 258-59.
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times and had been assaulted.22 In fact, the cafeteria had not been
padlocked, the police had not ringed the campus, King had been arrested not seven but four times, and King’s claim of being assaulted
had occurred a number of years earlier.23
Based on these inaccuracies, Montgomery Commissioner L.B. Sullivan sued The New York Times for defamation. Sullivan’s claim was
not strong. To begin with, the ad did not explicitly refer to him, and
there was nothing in its text that would tie him to any of the alleged
activities. It seemed, therefore, that Sullivan could not meet the basic requirement of a defamation suit that the alleged matters be “of
and concerning” the plaintiff.24 Further, it was not clear, in any
event, that Sullivan’s reputation would in any way be defamed or
tarnished in his community even if he were deemed to be one of the
subjects of the ad. Rather, given the spirit of the times, it is more
likely that his community standing would be improved by the suggestion that he opposed the civil rights demonstration.
These matters, however, did not deter the Alabama courts. The
Alabama jury awarded him damages of $500,000, an exorbitant
amount at that time in any jurisdiction and an even more outrageous
amount given that only 394 copies of the Times had been sold in Alabama and only thirty-five had been sold in Montgomery County.25
Even before it reached the Supreme Court, it was clear that the
action brought by Commissioner Sullivan against the Times was no
mere libel suit. Rather, the case marked a major battle between the
entrenched racist Southern power structure and the civil rights
movement. The purpose of the litigation was to chill press efforts to
cover the civil rights movement, and Sullivan’s initial victory in the
Alabama courts was a significant step in that direction.26 Not only
would the $500,000 verdict alone have been crippling to The New
York Times,27 but there were also numerous other libel suits against
the newspaper that were in the works at the time the case was decided.28 Yet even more was at issue than simply deterring Northern
media coverage. Sullivan’s victory signaled that those challenging
the status quo could expect to suffer considerable legal costs in
mounting their effort. As Rodney Smolla has explained, “to the extent that the verdict represented the special antipathy that the
community of Montgomery, Alabama felt for aggressive blacks and

22. Id. at 258.
23. Id. at 258-59.
24. Id. at 267 (noting that for the plaintiff to succeed in a defamation action in Alabama, a jury must find that the defamatory words were “of and concerning” the plaintiff).
25. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 30 (1986).
26. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW 34 (1991).
27. Id.
28. See SMOLLA, supra note 25, at 43-44.
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their Yankee fellow travelers, it threatened to cripple the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the laws.”29
With both press freedom and the civil rights movement at stake, it
is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court reversed the Alabama court’s decision. However, like Bush v. Gore, New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan was not exactly based upon firm doctrinal footing. Instead, the extent to which the decision paved new ground (and dug
up the old) cannot be overestimated. The following are only some of
the highlights.
To begin with, the decision effectively constitutionalized the law of
defamation. It removed a traditionally state-bound and state-defined
common law action from the state courts (and state legislators) into
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Prior to Sullivan, libel law had
not been thought to raise any First Amendment concern; and had
traditionally been within the exclusive province of the states. Second,
the Court’s rule of decision in the case, that a plaintiff could not succeed in a libel action against a public official unless he could show
that the defendant acted with “actual malice,” meaning knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,30 was not only wholly unprecedented in federal law31 but also ignored previous Court statements to the contrary.32 Third, the Court acquitted The New York
Times even though the facts of the case might still suggest the newspaper’s actions were subject to liability even under the new actual
malice standard. The Times apparently had the correct version of the
events in its files but had not crosschecked the account presented in
the ad with its own information.33
Yet, despite its enormous breadth and consequence, that the
Court reached the result it did appears virtually inevitable in hindsight. As Smolla notes,
[I]t is clear that the Supreme Court could no more permit southern
juries in libel trials to punish those who were seeking to snuff out
the yet unfulfilled promise of Brown v. The Board Of Education,
than it could permit southern legislation to outlaw or cripple the
NAACP. The case was arguably more the product of a due process
deficiency than a First Amendment concern, for against the backdrop of the period the problem was really one of litigation fairness:
four black preachers and a New York newspaper simply could not
get a fair trial in Alabama in 1960 in a case concerning civil rights
29. Id. at 35.
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
31. The Court relied on the law of a number of selected states in fashioning this standard. See id. at 280-83.
32. Prior to Sullivan, the Court had indicated that the First Amendment did not protect libel in a number of cases. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10
(1961); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
33. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287.
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issues. Had the events surrounding the Sullivan lawsuit not been
so patently racist, in fact, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court
would have bothered to hear just another libel suit at all. What
was not foreordained, however, was that in aid of the civil disobedience tactics of Martin Luther King and his followers, the Supreme Court would write an opinion that would forever influence
the way American law treated freedom of speech.34

In short, rough justice, not doctrine, dictated the result in the Sullivan case. Libel law, certainly, was forever changed by the decision.
But that was a result of the Court’s subsequent decisions applying
Sullivan to later cases—an option which now awaits the Court in its
future interpretations of Bush v. Gore. The fact that the case would
eventually enjoy precedential effect was only a by-product of the
Court’s efforts to achieve rough justice—it was not its cause.35
2. Henry v. Mississippi
If Sullivan was an example of a rough justice case in which the
Court would eventually abide by the doctrinal implications of its decision, Henry v. Mississippi 36 was an example of where the doctrine
created by a rough justice decision would eventually lead nowhere.
Aaron Henry was the president of both the Coahoma Mississippi
County Branch of the NAACP and of the NAACP’s State Conference
of Branches.37 He was convicted in Mississippi of disturbing the
peace by “indecent proposals to and offensive contact with an 18year-old hitchhiker to whom he is said to have given a ride in his
car.”38
The legal issue in Henry involved the application of the adequate
state ground doctrine, which governs when decisions by a state court
may be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. In the case itself, Henry’s attorney had failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds.39
Failure to raise the objection would, under Mississippi law, foreclose
consideration of the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, but the
Mississippi Supreme Court initially reached the constitutional issue
(and reversed the conviction) believing that Henry’s counsel was out34. SMOLLA, supra note 25, at 44-45.
35. In fact, Sullivan and its progeny have proved less than successful in fashioning a
law of defamation that both serves the purposes of the tort while protecting First Amendment interests. See generally William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the
First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169 (discussing how the rules
announced in Sullivan and later cases discourage responsible journalism).
36. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
37. See Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 190.
38. Henry, 379 U.S. at 444.
39. Id. at 445.
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of-state and not familiar with local procedure.40 After being informed
by the state, however, that Henry’s counsel was local, the Mississippi
court reversed its previous decision and held that the constitutional
issue could not be considered because of failure to comply with the
appropriate procedure.41
The United States Supreme Court reversed again. In an opinion
generously described by the Hart and Wechsler textbook as “confusing,”42 the Court held: 1) a state rule could not bar consideration of a
litigant’s federal rights unless the rule served a legitimate state interest;43 2) Mississippi’s contemporaneous objection requirement
served a legitimate state interest;44 and 3) Mississippi procedure
allowed litigants to raise a constitutional challenge to the evidence in
motions for directed verdict at the close of trial, which also served the
interests of the contemporaneous objection rule by allowing the judge
to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence and thus avoiding the
need for a new trial if the claim was meritorious.45 This meant that
the contemporaneous rule used to bar Henry’s appeal in effect served
no independent purpose.46 The Court, nevertheless, did not hold that
Henry’s claim could not be barred because of the ostensible superfluousness of the contemporaneous objection rule. Rather, it held that
the case should be remanded to determine if Henry’s counsel deliberately did not comply with the procedural rule.47 Why a deliberate
failure to object should be relevant if such failure itself was not an
adequate bar to consideration of the legal claim was not explained.
Despite its ambiguity, there was much in the Henry decision that,
if followed, could have dramatically changed the law of the adequate
state ground. For example, that the adequacy of one procedural rule
in barring a federal claim could be evaluated by reference to another
was itself a significant development. Even more broadly, as Justice
Harlan argued in dissent, the opinion may be read as “portend[ing] a
severe dilution, if not complete abolition, of the concept of ‘adequacy’
as pertaining to state procedural grounds.”48 Similarly, Professor
Terrance Sandalow, writing shortly after the decision, was also concerned that the opinion suggested the elimination of “the concept of
40. Id.
41. Id. at 445-46.
42. RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 584 (4th. ed. 1996).
43. Henry, 379 U.S. at 447.
44. Id. at 448. As the Court explained, “By immediately apprising the trial judge of
the objection, counsel gives the court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using the
tainted evidence. If the objection is well taken the fruits of the illegal search may be excluded from jury consideration, and a reversal and new trial avoided.” Id.
45. Id. at 448-49.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 451-53.
48. Id. at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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adequacy so far as state procedural grounds are concerned [a development which would ignore] the interests of both the litigants and
the judicial system in orderly procedure.”49
Sandalow, however, also foresaw another explanation of the
Court’s opinion.
Of all the problems raised by Henry, none is more trouble-some
than that of determining the material facts. Almost the first lesson
taught in law school is that “facts of person, time, [and] place . . .
are presumably immaterial unless stated [by the court] to be material. As a rule the law is the same for all persons, at all times,
and at all places within the jurisdiction of the court.” Yet, even
though not mentioned by the Court, is it really immaterial that the
petitioner was not merely a man charged with disturbing the
peace, but Aaron Henry, a Negro resident of Clarksdale, Mississippi, and president of both the Coahoma County Branch of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and of
its State Conference of Branches? Is it, moreover, immaterial that
the prosecution was commenced in 1962 in Mississippi and not at
another time and in another place? The traditional answer to these
questions, one suspects, is neither entirely realistic nor necessarily
desirable. Yet more than a lawyer’s conservatism argues for caution in accepting a conclusion that the Court was or ought to have
been influenced by such factors, particularly in a case which
touches what historically has been one of the more sensitive areas
of federal-state relationships.50

Subsequent events appear to have proved Sandalow’s latter explanation to be correct. As one textbook notes, “[d]espite its radical
potential, the Henry decision has had little effect on the standards
applied on direct review in judging the adequacy of state procedural
grounds.”51 The result in Henry, in short, was dictated not by doctrine
but by “the possibility that Henry’s prosecution was a consequence of
his active participation in the civil rights movement.”52 Rough justice,
not the adequate state ground rule, was the governing principle.
B. Supreme Court Intervention in Bush v. Gore Was Appropriate
The fact that stretching judicial power is not unprecedented, of
course, does not in itself justify its particular exercise in any given
case. Moreover, it might quickly be contended that Sullivan and
Henry are not proper precedents for Bush v. Gore. After all, both
cases involved protecting civil rights interests against a hostile and
entrenched political establishment. Sullivan and Henry, therefore,
49.
50.
51.
52.

Sandalow, supra note 37, at 239.
Id. at 190 (citations omitted).
FALLON ET AL., supra note 42, at 585.
Sandalow, supra note 37, at 196.
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might be viewed as classic examples of cases in which judicial intervention is most needed—cases in which the political processes cannot
be trusted to reach fair and just results on their own accord.53 In
Bush v. Gore, on the other hand, the prevailing litigant was anything
but politically marginalized and had access to virtually every possible political weapon. Accordingly, the case for extraordinary judicial
action is far weaker.54 This is a fair point. Undoubtedly, the courts
should be especially vigilant when the rights and interests of vulnerable groups are at stake. This does not mean, however, that extraordinary judicial intervention is inappropriate in all other circumstances. Factors other than the identities of the litigants may cry out
for special judicial action, and certainly if there were such a case,
Bush v. Gore would clearly have to be at the top of anyone’s list.
Consider just some of the amazing confluence of events that surrounded the case. The presidential election depended on the twentyfive electoral votes of the state of Florida. In the initial vote count in
Florida, Bush led Gore by 1,784 votes out of a total of over six million.55 Outside of Florida, Gore led in electoral votes and had won the
popular vote.56
The Florida Supreme Court, which had authorized a recount to
occur, was controlled by Democrats.57 The Florida Legislature, which
was empowered to submit its own slate of delegates, was controlled
by Republicans.58
53. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
54. Of course, if the Court was concerned with protecting the interests of political minorities then maybe it did reach the correct result. After all, the Bush side did receive
fewer votes.
55. Because this margin represented less than one-half of one percent of the total
number of votes cast, Florida law required a machine recount, which subsequently narrowed Bush’s lead to 930 votes. Following manual recounts ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, the final certified tally on November 26 (the date set by the court and twelve
days after the statutory deadline) found Bush with 2,912,790 votes and Gore with
2,912,253—a difference of 537. The Florida Supreme Court then allowed late submissions
from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties, which narrowed Bush’s lead to only 154
votes. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98, 100-03 (2000); Richard A. Ryan, Bush Declares
Victory; Gore Contests Results, DET. NEWS, Nov. 27, 2000, at 1.
56. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court intervened, Gore held 267 electoral votes to
Bush’s 246 and 50,158,094 popular votes to Bush’s 49,820,518 (a margin of 337,536). See
Marc Sandalow, Bush Pledges Unity/Analysis: Partisan Passions Won’t Be Dispelled
Easily, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2000, at A1. A later Washington Post analysis that accounted
for late-tallied absentee ballots in all fifty states put Gore’s popular-vote lead at 540,539.
See Charles Babington, Electors Reassert Their Role; Bush Wins Vote; Protest Costs Gore,
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A1.
57. All seven members of the court are Democratic appointees (one was jointly appointed by Lawton Chiles and Jeb Bush). Six are registered Democrats, one a Republican.
See Lisa Getter & Mitchell Landsberg, America Waits—Florida Top Court is in Glare of
Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A27.
58. Republicans held a 77 to 43 majority in the House and a 25 to 15 majority in the
Senate, and Democrats openly acknowledged they did not have the votes to stop Republicans from naming a slate of electors. See, e.g., David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Jeb
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The Constitution requires that if there are two or more slates of
electors presented from a given state, the decision of which slate will
be recognized will be made by the Congress.59 The Republicans controlled the House of Representatives.60 The Senate was divided 50-50,
but the Democrats would control it for purposes of ruling on an election challenge because the extant Vice President, who is empowered
to cast the tie-breaking vote, was a Democrat.61 That Vice President
was Gore. Federal law provides that if the Congress cannot agree on
a slate of electors that decision will devolve to the Governor of the
state with the contested slate.62 The Governor of Florida was Bush’s
brother.
The one thing that is clear from this scenario is that the voters of
2000 unknowingly created the definitive blueprint for stalemate.
Unless any of the political players were to rise above their own partisan interest, any decision resulting from this chaos would necessarily
reek of partisanship and self-dealing. And it was clear that none of
the players were prepared to abandon their partisan battle stations.63
Accordingly, any result achieved by either side would necessarily be
clouded by claims of illegitimacy.
Against this background, the United States Supreme Court may
have been the only institution that could be seen to be sufficiently
above the partisan fray to achieve a fair result. As John Yoo wrote,
“the United States Supreme Court may [have been] the only institution left that enjoy[ed] the legitimacy to bring the partisan struggle
over the presidential election to a final, if not infallible, conclusion.”64

Bush Is Said to Be Willing to Sign Bill Ensuring Republican Victory in Florida, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at A25.
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
60. Following the November elections, 221 Republicans, 211 Democrats, and 2 Independents comprised the House. See, e.g., Eliza Newlin Carney, David Baumann, & Bill
Ghent, A House Divided, 32 NAT’L J. 3555 (2000). The score is now 222 to 210 to 2, following a mid-June election in Virginia to fill a seat vacated by the March death of an incumbent. One Massachusetts seat remains vacant. See, e.g., Tyler Whitley, Forbes Victorious in
4th, GOP Adds Seat to Majority in House as Lucas Loses Bitter Race by 4 Points,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 20, 2001, at A1.
61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
62. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
63. One notable exception was Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska who wrote:
At some point this prolonged election will come to an end. One man will be declared president. The outcome must be seen as legitimate and honest, so the
new president has the credibility and validation to lead. Both parties will have
to come together and work with the president to govern. We cannot shove that
responsibility aside and wait for better results from another election. The challenges facing our nation are too great to be deferred.
Chuck Hagel, The Stakes Are Higher Than a Partisan Victory, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2000,
at B07.
64. John Yoo, The Right Moment for Judicial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at
A19.
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Arguably in fact, the Gore forces may have needed Supreme Court
intervention even more than the Bush side. The way the battle was
shaping, a state judicially ordered election resulting in a Gore slate
of electors would have been met with a slate of Bush electors chosen
by the Florida Legislature.65 The United States House of Representatives had made clear that it was going to recognize the Bush slate
and had begun a rhetorical campaign suggesting that any other result would be akin to a stealing of the election.66 Republican House
forces had begun a concerted campaign decrying the impermissible
“judicial activism” of the Democratic Florida Supreme Court67 and
had made clear that any result not favorable to Bush would be
treated as fraudulent.68 This strategy set up an inevitable political
fight for the mantle of legitimacy between the two potential slates,
and it was a fight that, at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision,
65. See, e.g., David Barstow, Lawmakers Move Closer to Special Florida Session for
Naming Bush Electors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A27; Ronald Brownstein, Rivals Down
to Heavy Artillery, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at A1; Gail Russell Chaddock, Congress Prepares for Plot Twists—if the Electoral College Tally is Ultimately Disputed, Lawmakers
Could Have a Say in Who’s President, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 22, 2000, at 1; Adam
Cohen, The Legal Challenges, TIME, Dec. 4, 2000, at 42; Ann McFeatters, Edgy Congress
Worries Over a Range of What-ifs, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 2000, at A8.
66. See Dana Milbank, Are We There Yet? Fascism? Theft in Progress? It’s Looking
Ugly, but the Bonds Won’t Break, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2000, at B01 (citing House Majority
Whip Tom DeLay’s description of Gore’s recount pursuit as a “theft in progress” and the
declaration from Christopher Shays, “a normally sober Connecticut Republican,” that
“[r]eally, what they’re trying to do is steal the election”); Blake Morrison, Recount Rhetoric
Reminds Some of Impeachment—Observers Concerned that Partisan Charges are “Spinning out of Control,” USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 2000, at A04.
“This thing is rigged,” Rep. David Hobson, R-Ohio, declared. “It is a joke on our
democracy.” And this about Gore from Rep. J.C. Watts, R-Okla. [and Chairman
of the House Republican Conference]: “This is a candidate who will not win or
lose honorably but will instead employ the cutthroat tactics that eight years
under President Clinton have taught him.”
Id.; McFeatters, supra note 65 (“House Majority Whip Tom DeLay . . . has sent around a
two-page memo noting that since Republicans control both houses—even though by a scant
majority—his party could make Bush president by firmly rejecting a state’s electoral votes
on the basis that members think such votes are tainted.”); Press Release, House Majority
Leader Dick Armey, Gore Team Will Do Anything to Win (Nov. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.freedom.gov/library/presidency/gore.asp (“The Florida Legislature has a duty to
step in and restore honesty and the rule of law to the election process. For the sake of
America’s democracy, they can do no less.”).
67. Press Release, Representative Tom DeLay, DeLay Criticizes Florida Supreme
Court Decision (Nov. 17, 2000); see also Press Release, Representative Tom DeLay, DeLay
on Latest Florida Supreme Court Decision: “Blatant and Extraordinary Abuse of Judicial
Power” (Nov. 21, 2000) (“[A] collection of liberal activists has arbitrarily swept away
thoughtfully designed statutes ensuring free and fair elections and replaced them with
their own political opinions.”); Armey, supra note 66 (“[Gore has] enlisted the Florida Supreme Court to rewrite the laws of Florida.”).
68. See Press Release, Representative Tom DeLay, Statement of Majority Whip Tom
DeLay on Latest Florida Supreme Court Decision (Dec. 8, 2000) (“The Florida Supreme
Court has squandered its credibility and violated the trust of the people of Florida in an attempt to manipulate the results of a fair and free election. This judicial aggression must
not stand.”).
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the Republicans were winning.69 Polls indicated that most Americans
believed Bush had prevailed in Florida and that Gore’s reluctance to
concede was evidence that he was a sore loser.70 Against this background, the moral authority of the United States Supreme Court may
have been the only weapon available to the Gore forces to combat
this campaign.71 A recount based only upon a constantly attacked decision of the Florida Supreme Court might not have been able to give
the Gore forces the legitimacy they would need to assume the Presidency. The imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court intervention would be critical.
II. DID THE COURT REACH THE RIGHT RESULT?
Concluding that Supreme Court intervention was appropriate, or
at least justifiable, does not mean that the Court’s ultimate decision
was correct. The case must also be made that notions of rough justice
required a ruling for Bush.
As noted earlier, there are at least three concerns that may have
led the Court to rule for Bush. First, the Court may have believed
that its decision was necessary to avoid the constitutional crisis that
would have inevitably occurred had the matter been referred to the
Congress. Second, the Court may have believed that its intervention
was necessary because the Gore forces were in effect manipulating
the vote totals so as to win the election. Third, the Court may have
felt its intervention necessary to reverse an ill-advised state court
decision. These arguments are discussed below.
A. The Ruling for Bush Was Necessary to Avoid
a Constitutional Crisis
The exigency of intervening to avoid the political chaos that might
follow if the matter were referred to the Congress has, as discussed
above, obvious appeal.72 The stalemate created by the election was
69. See William Safire, The Coming Together, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A39.
70. An NBC News poll conducted on November 27, 2000, by Robert Teeter, a Republican pollster, and Peter Hart, a Democratic pollster, found nearly sixty percent of those
polled believe that Bush won; while the poll was evenly split on whether Gore should concede immediately. Nearly half of those polled were more likely to find Gore’s legal appeals
symptomatic of a “sore loser” than of a candidate pursuing reasonable action. A USA Today/CNN poll taken the following day found that thirty-six percent of Gore supporters—a
new high at the time—were ready for the Vice President to concede. See Bill Lambrecht,
Polls Showing Loss of Support for Gore Are Coming Under Fire: Pollsters Say Many People
Aren’t Offered Choices on What They Really Believe, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 29,
2000, at A7.
71. See Yoo, supra note 64, at A19; see also Brownstein, supra note 65, at A1 (citing
observations by Harvard’s Heather Gerken and the Brookings Institution’s Thomas Mann
that the Court “may be the one institution with enough prestige to impose a widely accepted solution on the controversy”).
72. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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not likely to lead to any result that would be free of claims of foul and
illegitimacy, and the Supreme Court may have been the only institution with enough authority to impose a result that would have more
than partisan acceptance.
This does not mean, of course, that the intervention was not problematic from a legal standpoint. After all, if deferring the election to
the political branches was a blueprint for political disaster, it was a
blueprint nonetheless that came directly from the Constitution.73 Supreme Court intervention expressly to avoid a matter within the constitutional design, therefore, might be criticized as particularly activist. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the fears that political wrangling
alone could not lead to a result that would command sufficient legitimacy without Court intervention were more than simply plausible. Court intervention was likely to be necessary.
The constitutional crisis argument at this point, however, speaks
only in favor of Supreme Court intervention; it does not automatically support intervention favoring Bush. Such arguments are, however, available. The most obvious is that, as William Safire and others noted, the Republicans were poised to win the eventual battle.74
Supreme Court intervention, accordingly, would not change the result; it would only allow the country to avoid the agony that would
otherwise occur if resort to the political branches were to follow.
Seen in this light, ruling for Bush was the more limited ruling because it best complied with the political realities. As Safire argued:
Were it not for the court’s willingness to take the case and the
heat, internecine mud-wrestling would have gone on for at least
another month. If Gore had edged ahead in the counting of “undervotes,” Bush would have contested unexamined “overvotes.” If the
Florida Supremes had named a Gore slate of electors, the Florida
Legislature would have named its own; some electors in other
states may then have been seduced into faithlessness; ultimately,
the ever-more-angry dispute would have wound up in Congress. At
the end, with the G.O.P. in control of the clear majority of states,
we would have ended up exactly where we are today: with President-elect Bush. Along the way, many now-reasonable opponents
would have become implacable enemies, and the electorate would
have been not just evenly divided but angrily polarized. The Supreme Court, at some cost to its own serenity but not to its historic
reputation, saved us from that.75

On closer examination, however, Safire’s argument is subject to
serious critique. First, the reason that the Florida Legislature was
choosing its own slate was because it was intending not to honor a
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
74. See Safire, supra note 69, at A39.
75. Id.
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judicial decision.76 If the United States Supreme Court’s decision to
short-circuit the political process was based upon its reaction to this
tactic, it was thus in effect giving in to (and therefore rewarding) extreme political strategies.77 Indeed it would be submitting to tactics
that were expressly designed to threaten judicial independence and
chill judicial decisionmaking—exactly the types of actions to which
the Supreme Court should be most wary of succumbing.78
Second, a closer examination of the costs in allowing the political
processes to proceed in pursuit of an eventual Bush victory is also
warranted. Clearly Safire is right in part.79 Animosity between the
sides would increase as the days dragged on and the country would
suffer polarization. The eventual Bush Presidency may also have
been weakened and the Court may have been interested in preserving the presidential institution.80 As the Court stated in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,81 there is a need “to maintain prestige as an element of
Presidential influence.”82 But assuming an eventual Bush victory, the
most obvious losers would be the Republicans. Had the Republicans
76. The November 22, 2000, statement from Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida
House of Representatives, following the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Palm Beach
Canvassing Board v. Harris, indicated that the legislature wanted, above all, to nullify the
court’s decision and squelch the growing electoral din:
In my view, the court’s ruling indicated the tremendous lack of respect that
the Florida Supreme Court has for the laws of the state of Florida and the
legislature. The court continues to supplant its personal preferences over the
statutory law of Florida, which was passed by the elected members of the legislature. Yesterday, if the court had merely enforced firm and clear statutory
deadlines, the Florida Supreme Court could have given us a resolution. Instead, I fear, it has given us a potential constitutional crisis.
The people of Florida have elected 160 members of the legislature and
charged us with the creation and the protection of their laws. In my view, the
judicial branch has clearly overstepped their powers.
Federal News Service, Statement by Tom Feeney (R-FL), Speaker of the House, Florida Legislature Re: Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling on Manual Recounts, Nov. 22, 2000, LEXIS
News Group File; see also David Cox, Lawmakers Join Bush’s Case, House Speaker Tom
Feeney Said Legislators Want Justices to Know They Might Take Action, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Nov. 25, 2000, at A14 (quoting Speaker Feeney: “The Legislature’s participation
is intended to make the United States Supreme Court aware of the Legislature’s concerns
and the possible consequences that may flow from the state judicial action to date.”).
77. See Barber & Fleming, supra note 14, at 10 (“The party that threatened institutional meltdown won because it threatened institutional meltdown.”).
78. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the Florida election
procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of
the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to
proceed. . . . The endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can
only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land.
Id.
79. See Safire, supra note 69, at A39.
80. But see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
81. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
82. Id. at 757.
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strong-armed the political result by systematically rejecting a judicially ordered recount, they would have risked serious political backlash and would have undoubtedly lost significant political capital.
Whether the Supreme Court should have intervened to serve these
partisan interests seems less apparent.
Of course, there may be an alternative explanation. There also
may have been another constitutional crisis the Court may have
wished to avoid. While most assume that the constitutional crisis to
be avoided would be the political fight in Congress,83 the actual constitutional crisis the Court may have wished to avoid may have been
its own. Ruling for Bush may also have been the best way for the
Court to protect its own institutional capital. This is because of the
scenario that may have resulted if the recount had proceeded and a
Gore slate was elected. In that circumstance, as noted before, there
would likely have been two conflicting slates of electors. A divided
Congress presumably would not have been able to decide on a victor.84 In that circumstance, federal law suggests that the governor of
the disputed state may choose the slate of electors.85 Presumably,
Governor Jeb Bush would choose his brother but also presumably the
Gore forces would seek an order from the Florida courts ordering Jeb
Bush to pick the Gore slate. The Republicans, however, were poised
to dismiss any unfavorable decision, meaning that an order of the
Florida court to Jeb Bush ordering him to certify the Gore slate may
well have been ignored. The inevitable result, of course, is that the
matter would be returned to the Supreme Court. At this point, the
Court’s decision would have been even starker than was the one it
faced in November and December. The Court would be asked, at considerable political risk to itself, to either require Jeb Bush to certify
the Gore slate (and thus create a Gore victory) or allow Jeb Bush to
reject the Florida court order (and thus create a Bush victory). The
Supreme Court, in short, would be forced to directly determine who
would be President. Seen in this light, Bush v. Gore was not an exercise in judicial courage, it was an exercise in judicial selfpreservation.
83. See generally Barber & Fleming, supra note 14, at 2 (exploring the possibility
that, given the looming chaos, Bush v. Gore amounts to an “act of judicial statesmanship”).
84. See, e.g., Matthew Vita & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Braces for Battle Over Electoral Votes, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2000, at A19 (noting the lengthy list of obstacles to congressional resolution: partisan wrangling over a potential “confrontation that members of
both parties say they [did] not want,” widespread acknowledgement of a lack of constitutional precedent, the threat that Florida’s votes might not be counted, and the possibility
that Gore himself might preside over a joint session of Congress convened to determine the
election’s winner); McFeatters, supra note 65, at A8 (noting that some members of Congress, including then Minority Leader Tom Daschle, were “already talking about appointing a ‘blue-ribbon’ panel” rather than “send the whole mess to a deeply divided new Congress”).
85. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
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B. The Gore Forces Were Manipulating the Recount
The Court may have also intervened because it believed that the
Gore forces were improperly manipulating the recount to achieve victory. In at least one sense, intervening for this purpose would seem
less objectionable than intervening to avoid a constitutional crisis because, as noted previously, the potential crisis was a product of the
express design of the Constitution. Intervening to prevent an injustice, however, seems more in line with the motivations that may have
led to the Court’s actions in cases like Sullivan and Henry.
On the other hand, intervening for this purpose did not necessarily require ruling for Bush. It only required preventing any improper
manipulation. Remember, the key problem in the way the count was
proceeding was not that there were any colorable allegations of
fraud. Rather, the claim was that the various counties had differing
standards in a way that would lead to a Gore victory. An appropriately fashioned remedy, however, could have easily cured this harm.
Ordering the Florida courts to impose a uniform standard and requiring that the standards be effectively policed86 would have resolved this potential problem.87
Moreover, if intervention to avoid an unjust result was truly the
motivating force in this case, then it would seem that in addition to
reacting to concerns about potential fraud the Court should have also
examined where the equities of a fair resolution of this matter lay. In
this respect, two other factors seem particularly significant.
First, Gore won the electoral vote count outside of Florida. Given
the closeness of the election in Florida and the numerous ballot and
tabulation controversies surrounding the election, any result, no
matter how it was achieved, would be open to subsequent question.88
In effect, no result from Florida could ever be assumed to be accurate. Certainly, in balancing the equities, it would seem relevant to
determine who would have won if the Florida votes were simply
86. Given the public attention given to the ongoing vote recounts, there was likely
very little chance that actual ballot tampering could take place.
87. It may also have supplied the recount process with a legitimacy the Gore forces
desperately needed. Although there were no colorable allegations of actual fraud in the recount process, media attention and Republican attacks had created an impression of malfeasance. Supreme Court affirmation of the recount process might have done much to
eliminate this perception.
88. Undoubtedly, this realization may have been a factor in the Court’s decision to put
the matter to rest. There would be no reason to assume that any method of counting would
be a better method in determining who won Florida than any other. Accepting the initial
results, then, might be seen as simply adopting a default position designed to end what
could otherwise be an endless process. But why should the happenstance of Bush’s 537vote lead at the time of certification be the default position? The equities of Gore winning
the electoral vote outside of Florida, as well as likely having had more people intend to vote
for him in Florida, would suggest that allowing a recount to proceed and, in effect, create a
new default position may have been the fairest way to proceed.
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taken off the table. The answer, of course, was Gore. In an election in
which Florida’s votes are not counted, Gore wins the Presidency.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, virtually no one was disputing that more people in Florida had intended to vote for Gore
than for Bush. The problems with the butterfly ballot, for example,
although not remediable through court challenge, nevertheless
clearly indicated that many people who thought they had voted for
Gore had actually voted for Buchanan. Adding these numbers to the
Gore total would have clearly given him a numerical lead over Bush.
None of these factors (nor the fact that Gore won the popular
vote),89 needed to lead the Court to rule that Gore had won the election. They do, however, make a case for the argument that Gore’s losing the Presidency because of fewer than 600 votes in a state where
the election results were at best highly uncertain had profound elements of injustice. And in this respect, it is critical to reemphasize
that the question facing the Court was not determining who had
won. It was only whether a recount should be allowed to proceed.
Given his electoral-vote advantage and the likelihood that more voters in Florida intended to vote for him than Bush, the equities favored at least allowing Gore the chance to establish by a more complete vote count that he may have actually won Florida.
C. The Florida Court’s Decision Required Reversal
The final reason the Court may have intervened and ruled for
Bush is because it believed the Florida Supreme Court decision was
so lawless and unfounded that it required reversal. If this indeed was
the reason, then the Court’s action again has pedigree. Similar concerns undoubtedly influenced the Court in cases like Ward v. Love
County90 and others in which the Supreme Court rejected a state’s
manipulative construction of its own law in a manner designed to
avoid federal court review and promote an unjust result.91
89. Some may also suggest that the fact Gore won the national popular vote should
also be relevant in the weighing of equities. I agree with the comments of John McGinnis
in rejecting that view. See John O. McGinnis, Popular Sovereignty and the Electoral College, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 995-96 (2001). The political campaigns of both parties
were aimed at winning electoral, not popular, votes. Id. at 996. The Bush campaign, for
example, did not need to expend campaign resources in states such as Texas, Virginia, and
Oklahoma, because it was virtually guaranteed that he would win those states. If popular
votes were at issue, on the other hand, his campaign would have undoubtedly chosen to
devote time and financial resources to those states in order to maximize overall vote
counts. Gore’s strategy with respect to motivating and turning out the vote in his safe
states, similarly, would have changed had it been known that winning the popular vote
would be a cognizable factor in winning the election.
90. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
91. In the inaptly named Love County case, the state coerced American Indians to pay
a tax from which they had claimed a federal immunity by threatening to sell their lands if
the tax was not paid. Id. at 20. The state courts then held that the Indians were barred
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Protecting litigants from abusive state courts also, of course, motivated the Court in cases like Sullivan.92 The Alabama courts in that
case were clearly acting with a political agenda93 and the United
States Supreme Court stepped in to prevent that political agenda
from becoming an injustice. Unlike Sullivan, however, the Court in
Bush v. Gore may have missed a step. Concluding that a decision has
been improperly reached does not mean its result is unjust. Even if
the Florida court’s actions were “lawless,” an independent examination of whether its result was nevertheless unjust would seem necessary before reversal—particularly if the Court’s guiding principle
was “rough justice.”
Certainly, as with the decision of the Supreme Court, the opinion
of the Florida Supreme Court in Gore v. Harris was not a model of
clarity or judicial craftsmanship. It may be soundly criticized on numerous points including, most tellingly, for its creation of a new
deadline for which the counties must certify their results to the Secretary of State.94 However, the conclusion that the Florida court’s decision was not soundly based in legal doctrine does not necessarily
mean that it should be reversed. For example, Judge Posner excuses
the doctrinal weaknesses of the United States Supreme Court opinion on the grounds that it may have involved a “judgment in advance
of doctrine,” by which he means that the Court may have understood
which direction it should go before it worked out the legal niceties of
how to get there.95 But the same might be said about the decision of
the Florida Supreme Court. If the United States Supreme Court was
empowered to try and effectuate rough justice, why should the same
not be true for the Florida Supreme Court? If the United States Supreme Court should be excused from authoring an opinion not
soundly based on legal doctrine, why should the Florida Supreme
Court also not be similarly excused?

from challenging the legality of the tax because they had paid it “voluntarily.” Id. at 21.
The Supreme Court rejected the sham and held that the Indians’ ability to challenge the
tax was not foreclosed. Id. at 24-25. Love County is a powerful example of the Court’s ability to pierce the veil of a lower court decision in order to prevent the state court from manipulating its own law in order to shield itself from constitutional scrutiny.
92. See SMOLLA, supra note 25, at 44-45.
93. See id. Any criticism of the Florida Supreme Court for acting on partisan grounds
must be tempered by the fact that in key cases the Court actually ruled for Bush when
holding otherwise would have inevitably led to a Gore victory. Conversely, its decision in
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), only gave Gore the chance of eventually prevailing through a recount. For example, a favorable decision for Gore on the butterfly ballots (including a statistically based remedy) could have resulted in the switch of enough
votes from the Buchanan column to the Gore column to sway the election.
94. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 628-29. “I am aware of no general principle of equity
that would allow a court to ride roughshod over a particular time limitation contained in a
statute in favor of its own alternative date.” Id. (citation omitted).
95. POSNER, supra note 7, at 23.
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The Court, in short, also had the option to rehabilitate the Florida
court’s opinion, as well as to reverse it. And there were numerous
avenues through which salvaging the Florida decision may have been
possible. First, the Court could have been more deferential to the
Florida court’s efforts at statutory construction.96 Indeed even if the
Court disagreed with the Florida court’s statutory construction efforts, it could have remanded for clarification.97 Most importantly,
the Court could have concluded that it was permissible for the Florida court to inform its statutory construction by reference to constitutional principles.98 This would not be amending the law as the concurring opinion suggests,99 rather it would be assuming, as is generally true in statutory construction, that laws are enacted with the
legislative intent that it should be construed consistently with constitutional provisions.100 Finally, the Court could have refused to be so
hasty in determining that a recount could not proceed because of the
alleged importance of the “safe harbor” provision to the construction
of Florida law. At the least, the Court could have remanded the case
to Florida to ascertain whether Florida law required a cessation of
the vote count in order to comply with the safe harbor provision.101
96. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 752 (“The Florida Supreme Court decision that was
overturned in Bush v. Gore was consistent with the plain language of the principal statute
involved—the Florida statute governing contests of election certifications—and neither the
concurring opinion nor, as far as I am aware, anyone else, has seriously contended otherwise.”).
It is also notable that the Florida court’s expansion of the certification deadline—
arguably its most jurisprudentially criticized action—was an action that did not meaningfully affect the legal interests of candidate Bush. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a
Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 667-69 (noting that the certification
deadline is “not absolute” because it merely represents the end of the “pre-certification” period, and that as such the Florida Supreme Court’s deadline extension did not prevent
“disenfranchisement” but rather had the “perverse” effect of adding “twelve days to a phase
that had no real legal significance,” at the expense of the contest period, “the time for obtaining genuine legal relief ” ).
97. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
98. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (pointing out that under the broad equal protection principles espoused in Bush v. Gore, “manual recounts might even seem
constitutionally compelled”).
99. See Bush v. Gore, 31 U.S. 98, 118 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he
[Florida] court’s interpretation of ‘legal vote,’ and hence its decision to order a contestperiod recount, plainly departed from the legislative scheme.”).
100. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 749.
The Florida Supreme Court did not declare that something the legislature had
done was unconstitutional under the state constitution. At worst, the Florida
Supreme Court relied on the state constitution for general principles of a kind
that could easily be seen as part of the background against which the legislature knowingly enacted the Florida election laws—which is how the Florida
Supreme Court explained its opinion on remand.
Id.
101. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 767-68.
[The U.S. Supreme Court] concluded that as a matter of Florida law, a continuation of the manual recount “could not be part of an ‘appropriate’ order authorized by” Florida law.
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In fact three reasons would indicate that the Court should have
deferred to the state court if at all possible. First, general federalism
principles would suggest that the Court defer to the Florida court.
Inelegant as its opinion may have been, the Florida Supreme Court
was, after all, ultimately attempting to discern Florida law. Second,
judicial comity would argue in favor of respecting a judicial decision
rather than joining with those claiming that the judicial enterprise
was illegitimate.102 Third, and most importantly, the Florida Supreme Court decision was guided by the animating principle that all
votes should be counted. This principle not only resonates in what
may be “rough justice,” it also resonates in the Constitution and in
the essential vision of democracy. The animating principle of the
United States Supreme Court in holding for Bush, on the other hand,
is both far less clear and far less compelling. None of the rationales
offered in defense of the Court’s decision would seem to overcome the
straightforward principle relied on by the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida court, in short, may have had the better sense of rough
justice.
CONCLUSION
Bush v. Gore may be easily condemned for its doctrinal and theoretical shortcomings. These condemnations, however, miss the essential point. The case was not one about doctrine. Rather it was about
rough justice. As such, the case was neither illegitimate nor unprecedented. Exceptional cases may demand exceptional solutions and
Bush v. Gore was undoubtedly an exceptional case.

This was a blunder. It is true that the Florida Supreme Court had emphasized the importance, for the Florida Legislature, of the safe harbor provision.
But the Florida courts had never been asked to say whether they would interpret Florida law to require a cessation in the counting of votes, if the consequence of the counting would be to extend the choice of electors past December
12. In fact the Florida Court’s pervasive emphasis on the need to ensure the inclusion of lawful votes would seem to indicate that if a choice must be made between the safe harbor and the inclusion of votes, the latter might have priority.
It is not easy to explain the United States Supreme Court’s failure to allow the
Florida Supreme Court to consider this issue of Florida law.
Id.; Strauss, supra note 5, at 742.
At the very least, it was uncertain what the Florida Supreme Court would
have said if forced to choose between the safe harbor and continued counting.
In the face of any uncertainty about the Florida Legislature’s intentions, for the
United States Supreme Court to attribute such an unlikely intention to the
Florida Legislature without even remanding, to see what the Florida Supreme
Court would say, is inexplicable—unless, of course, the United States Supreme
Court simply did not trust the Florida Supreme Court to play it straight.
Id.
102. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
sided with those attacking judicial legitimacy).
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That the Court may have reached its eventual result by applying
its own notions of rough justice thus should not be conclusive in
evaluating the integrity of the decision. It does, however, suggest
that the opinion may properly be held up to an examination of
whether the decision actually effectuated the justice it was purportedly designed to serve. It is with respect to that inquiry, however,
that the case comes up short. The ostensible motivating factors underlying the Court’s decision, avoiding a prolonged constitutional crisis, preventing improper vote manipulation, and/or reversing an ostensibly lawless opinion, do not stand up under close scrutiny. The
first rationale turns out primarily to be abdication to extremist political tactics. The second concern is a matter that could be resolved
by judicial remedy. The third is little more than the pot calling the
kettle. Both the United States and the Florida Supreme Courts were
engaged in the same endeavor. Both were beleaguered courts attempting to achieve a fair and just result out of an impossible set of
circumstances. Both issued opinions that were substantially less
than legally compelling.
The Florida court’s opinion, however, did have one relative virtue.
Its animating principle, counting the votes, was clear and fundamental. Accordingly, when evaluating Bush v. Gore and its relationship
to rough justice, it may be that the United States Supreme Court
opinion was the one that should have been reversed.

